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1. Introduction
Legal doctrinal scholarship is not a discipline that can be said to engage in l’art 
pour l’art. Legal scholars enjoy discussing current affairs and recent cases and 
take particular pride in seeing their work cited in a judgment or in parliamentary 
debate. Many legal scholars also justify their research topics by referring to new 
developments in practice, displaying more interest in the societal relevance than 
in the academic relevance of their work. However, to assess the quality of legal 
research as a contribution to the advancement of knowledge, i.e., as science, it 
is crucial to know how it relates to the approaches and theories in the academic 
field.
Within legal scholarship, the academic embedding of a research project often 
takes the form of a summary of the current state of positive law, combining ref-
erence to primary sources such as legislation and court cases with reference to 
handbooks and recent journal articles. What is less clear is how the researchers 
in question relate to different points of view in their academic field and how they 
evaluate the previous research done in that field. This is not to say that legal schol-
ars ignore these issues while conducting research but rather that they leave them 
largely implicit in their writings (Hutchinson & Duncan 2012, p. 107).
If we compare legal scholarship with related disciplines, the social sciences seem 
to pay more explicit attention to such issues.1 In social sciences, the relationships 
to existing approaches and theories are usually spelled out in the theoretical 
framework of the research project.2 The theoretical framework gives the context 
for the research, and it provides the conceptual basis. The idea of a theory in this 
context refers to a systematized, coherent body of knowledge based on earlier 
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1 Most disciplines within the humanities, such as philosophy or literary studies, are also not very 
explicit about the academic embedding of the research. In philosophy, for instance, a common 
approach is to use or react to one particular theory rather than situating the research in the 
broader field. 
2 What is said about theory and theoretical frameworks in the social sciences is mostly also true 
of the natural sciences, which is similarly focused on the connection between theory and empir-
ical research results. I will not discuss natural sciences here.
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(empirical) research. Ideally, the theoretical framework justifies the research 
question, by showing how the question arises from the gaps or tensions in exist-
ing research. Leaving aside purely theoretical research, in the social sciences the 
theoretical framework provides the support for a descriptive or explanatory ques-
tion, advancing possible explanations or causes that need to be investigated in 
empirical work.
If one grants that an explicit theoretical framework is also useful in legal research, 
an important question is whether it has the same function and should have the 
same character as in a social science project. One thing to take into account is 
that the focus of legal doctrinal research is rather different. Legal scholars have a 
particular way of engaging in descriptive or explanatory work, using an interpre-
tive method (Van Hoecke 2011) and not usually engaging in empirical research. 
Moreover, many legal research questions are not descriptive or explanatory but 
normative: they evaluate a legal state of affairs or offer a solution to a legal prob-
lem. The latter also gives the framework for the research a different character: it 
not only needs to show the link to research that has already been done in the aca-
demic field or give the concepts to be used, but it also needs to provide the basis 
for the evaluation or solution. In such a context, rather than a general theoretical 
framework, it has to be a normative framework. This then raises the further ques-
tion of defining the exact relationship between theoretical and normative frame-
works in the legal context. The concept of a normative framework seems narrower 
than that of a theoretical framework: while a theoretical framework can provide 
support for a variety of research questions, a normative framework is specifically 
needed to provide standards for evaluation.
In this article, the functions of theoretical and normative frameworks for legal 
research will be investigated and contextualized. The first part of the article 
concerns these functions directly, answering the question: how do normative 
frameworks relate to theoretical frameworks more generally in the context of 
legal research? Using methodological work within social science as an inspira-
tion, in Section 2 the role of theoretical frameworks is explained. In Section 3, 
a contrast between social science and legal scholarship is used to show that legal 
research uses normative frameworks in addition to theoretical frameworks. Sec-
tion 4 presents different kinds of normative frameworks. The second part of the 
article concerns the background of the discussion on theoretical and normative 
frameworks. Here the question is: from what theoretical perspective can a close 
connection between explanatory and normative scholarship be argued for? In 
Section 5, this question is explained on the basis of the discussion about the links 
between normativity and description in legal scholarship. In Sections 6 and 7, a 
particular argument from a pragmatist perspective is advanced on how to under-
stand the relationship between the two, descriptive-explanatory and normative 
frameworks.
A terminological note at the start: the point of departure for this contribution is 
legal doctrinal scholarship, understood as academic legal research that focuses on 
positive law. Often, legal doctrinal scholarship is distinguished from socio-legal 
and theoretical legal scholarship (Watkins & Burton 2013)—and then the former 
is often rather pejoratively referred to as a ‘black-letter’ approach (e.g., Salter & 
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Mason 2007). However, current academic legal doctrinal work is linked to broader 
approaches to law in many ways, making it more correct to see the distinction 
between doctrinal and other legal scholarship as one involving many possible 
intermediate steps (Vranken 2012; Taekema 2011). It does make sense, however, 
to make a basic distinction between research that focuses primarily on studying 
positive law and research that has a broad, ‘law and’, orientation from the outset 
such as law and economics, socio-legal studies, legal philosophy or law and litera-
ture. Therefore, doctrinal scholarship hereafter will refer to positive-law-oriented 
research, and legal scholarship will refer to the broader field of academic research 
from a legal perspective.
2. The Purposes of a Theoretical Framework
At the outset, it is necessary to give an account of a theory or theoretical frame-
work. In its most basic form, a theory can be described as a coherent account of 
a particular phenomenon or aspect of the world. Typically, a theory specifies cer-
tain relations between items making up a phenomenon or between a phenomenon 
and its environment. For example, we could say that a theory of education gives 
an account of how a student learns, specifying what the influence of teachers, of 
learning activities and of other students are on the learning process. In order to 
construct a theory, it is necessary to define its basic concepts and to explain how 
these concepts relate to each other. Crucially, a theory is an account of something 
devised by a researcher, or several researchers jointly or consecutively, and is thus 
itself a construct of the theorist’s mind. There is an understandable tendency to 
see theories as abstract entities, removed from our social reality. It is important 
to note, however, that the abstraction of theories is highly variable: a theory 
about law can be as abstract as H.L.A. Hart’s account of the legal system as the 
combination of primary and secondary rules and as concrete as the theory that 
causation in the context of tort law means a condicio sine qua non.
In the context of legal scholarship, theoretical frameworks are not often addressed, 
and if they are, it is in the context of methodology discussions.3 Usually, research 
is driven by current developments in doctrinal debate or legal practice, and the 
fact that there is a problem in the current state of positive law is enough justifi-
cation for doing research. This has led some scholars to argue that the (implicit) 
theoretical framework for legal scholarship is the current legal system itself 
(Westerman 2011). Others contend that the theoretical framework is broader, 
i.e., that it must include a perspective on the legal system (Vranken 2011). I will 
return to this point in the next section. The way the role and character of the the-
oretical framework are sketched depends on the characterization of the discipline 
of legal scholarship, and thus reflects debates on the character of the discipline 
(Van Hoecke 2011, p. 3; Vranken 2011, pp. 117-118). In the academic discipline 
3 For the Dutch context, see IJzermans 2015 for references and as one of the few sustained 
attempts to develop this.
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of law, discussion of theoretical frameworks as part of methodology instruction 
is rare or highly limited.4 This is different in the social sciences, where a theo-
retical framework is a standard element in research instruction (e.g., Maxwell 
2013; Babbie 2013). Therefore, the following general discussion is based on social 
science insights that I deem relevant for legal research as well. I will turn to the 
specifics of frameworks for legal research at the end of the section and in the next.
In the context of research design, theories may have different roles that all relate 
to the starting point or context of the research project. Because theories can be 
regarded as a comprehensive point of departure for research and thus framing 
a project, I will use the term ‘theoretical framework’ rather than just ‘theory’ in 
order to highlight their role in a methodological setting. There are various pur-
poses for which a discussion of a theoretical framework may be included in one’s 
research, and I will highlight three. The first, and possibly most important, pur-
pose of including a theoretical framework is to embed the research project at hand 
in the state of the art. This means that a description of the theoretical framework 
shows how the project is related to the work of others. Most simply, this can be 
a description of previous research results on the same topic. For instance, if the 
topic is the use of the legislator’s intention as a method of constitutional interpre-
tation, it is useful to describe the existing debate on originalism in constitutional 
interpretation (Barber & Fleming 2007). Using this example, it is possible to spec-
ify further the idea of describing the state of the art: it is an account of the debate 
between different views on the topic. It is not simply an enumeration of what has 
been done before, but it is also an account of how these different views and results 
relate. Although in some areas there is a clear majority view on an issue, in most 
legal research there are competing points of view providing opposing theories.
This first purpose, of embedding work in the state of the art, may be broader 
than discussion of a theoretical framework; the state of the art, strictly speak-
ing, need not always concern the theoretical underpinnings of the project, but 
may also concern previous research results or methodologies. In many research 
handbooks, this purpose is therefore discussed as being served by a literature 
review (Blumberg et al. 2008; Randolph 2009). However, a part of such a litera-
ture review will usually be devoted to linking the topic to the theories in the field. 
In this sense, a theoretical framework cannot simply be an account of the state of 
the art, because the theoretical framework needs to specify how the project itself 
exactly relates to previous work.
That leads to the second purpose of discussing a theoretical framework: it makes 
clear to which scholarly tradition a project is connected. A scholarly tradition 
is understood in a broad sense here: it can be the standard way of conducting 
research in an academic field or discipline, or it can be a particular theoretical or 
ideological approach to the topic. Linking to a particular approach is especially 
4 This is part of a broader problem of the lack of methodology textbooks that give practical 
instruction on how to do legal doctrinal research. Books on legal method in English are usually 
practice oriented (e.g., McLeod 2005), while academic methods books pay more attention to 
socio-legal research than to doctrinal research (e.g., McConville & Chui 2007). 
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important in academic fields that are characterized by entrenched pluralism. For 
instance, in international relations there is a long-standing debate between real-
ism, liberalism, critical theory and constructivism (Burchill & Linklater 2013). 
In such a field, it is particularly necessary to reflect on the approach to align 
with. To return to the example of legislators’ intentions, there are various ways 
to approach the issue of constitutional interpretation. It is possible to discuss 
methods of constitutional interpretation as a matter of constitutional law, focus-
ing on the use of these methods in constitutional cases and their relation to con-
stitutional doctrines, or as a form of legal philosophy, focusing on the theory of 
legislative intent and the (im)possibility of uncovering this, or as a form of legal 
reasoning, focusing on the mechanisms to (re)construct legislators’ intentions. 
An important purpose of the theoretical framework is that it makes clear how 
a project relates to one or more scholarly traditions. If there is a large degree of 
consensus in the field in question, the state of the art and the scholarly tradition 
may coincide, but more often, as noted, a particular approach needs to be chosen. 
For instance, in company law, the role of company management may be explained 
by using a principal-agent theory, relating managers to shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). However, a competing theory focuses on stakeholders: seeing 
management as accountable to various groups, not only to shareholders but also 
to others such as employees and consumers (Freeman 1984). Although it may be 
the purpose of one’s research to test the explanatory power of one theory over the 
other, it is often sufficient to use one scholarly approach as the starting point for 
one’s project. In the first example, of constitutional interpretation, the choice of 
theoretical framework is more a matter of choosing an academic subfield, while in 
the second example it is a matter of a particular theoretical approach.
Such an approach can be used for the third purpose of a theoretical framework: 
being a resource for various tools for conducting one’s research. Most obviously, 
theoretical frameworks serve as conceptual frameworks, by providing a set of 
concepts that can be used for the project. They also provide descriptive links or 
explanations. Thus, for instance, principal-agent theory provides the two cru-
cial concepts of its name, principal versus agent, and the related idea of agency 
costs, which provides a particular idea of how principal and agent relate. All of 
these concepts may be useful in a company law project. Similarly, a theoretical 
framework may be the starting point for the choice of a certain methodology. 
Many theoretical frameworks have been developed by using particular methods, 
and this suggests a close relationship between the theory and the methodological 
approach used. For instance, if a project is situated in behavioral law and econom-
ics, it builds on a theory developed through lab experiments (Sunstein 2000), and 
a natural way to go ahead is to continue with a new experiment. Similarly, by 
situating one’s research in the tradition of legal anthropology, the value of using 
an ethnographic method is made plausible.
All of these uses of a theoretical framework are therefore relevant to research 
design and give context to research questions. The relevance of a research ques-
tion is shown most clearly if it is justified on the basis of a theoretical framework 
(Van Hoecke 2011, p. 14).
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3. From a Theoretical to a Normative Framework
Borrowing from social science research to explain theoretical frameworks has the 
advantage of being able to draw on explicit discussions of their role, but there are 
also drawbacks. These are mostly related to the context of social science as an 
empirical discipline centering on gathering data. In most social science research 
manuals, this context is the point of departure. In such social science research, a 
theoretical framework has a specific role in research design that is distinct from 
the empirical research to be conducted (Layder 1998; Maxwell 2013). The theo-
retical and empirical components of the research complement each other: the the-
ory generates a research problem and a possible explanation, which can be tested 
empirically. In quantitative research especially, this is pictured as a cycle: starting 
with a theory, which leads to a hypothesis, which leads to empirical observation 
and analysis, leading back to improvement of the theory, after which the cycle 
continues with the next round (Corbetta 2003, pp. 57-59). The role of the theo-
retical framework is less clearly defined if the research is qualitative: there is not 
always a specific hypothesis that can be tested, and sometimes the research itself 
is mainly theoretical, not involving an empirical component. Some qualitative 
research develops the theory after collecting empirical data: for instance, in the 
approach of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967).
In legal research, doing empirical work, in the sense of gathering data about social 
reality, is not the common approach.5 What complicates matters further is that 
the research questions addressed in legal research may vary considerably. While 
social science research attempts to answer descriptive and explanatory questions, 
aiming to explain features of human behavior and society, legal research also 
attempts to answer evaluative and normative questions. Such questions have a 
need for a different kind of framework, not one that can explain why law is what 
it is, but a framework that can provide arguments for a judgment that the law is 
good or bad. An explanatory theoretical framework does not provide such argu-
ments. To return to the area of company law, knowing why there are incentives 
in company structures for managers to act in their own interest rather than in 
the interest of the people they work for does not in itself yield a normative judg-
ment on that structure. If the argument is that companies are legally designed to 
prevent managers from pursuing their own interests, i.e., arguing that company 
law has particular goals, one can assess whether these goals are achieved with 
the present legal structure. This evaluative question needs to be answered on the 
basis of standards (in this case, the purposes of company law) against which a 
legal situation can be assessed.
Rather than an explanatory theoretical framework, legal research pursuing nor-
mative questions needs a normative framework. Under the broad rubric of nor-
mative questions we usually group evaluative questions, assessing the positive or 
5 However, empirical legal research is becoming more popular rapidly and is also the subject of 
methodological work. See, for example, the articles in Law and Method by Van den Bos & Hulst 
2016, Dhami & Belton 2016, Melville & Hincks 2016, and Webley 2016.
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negative quality of law, and prescriptive questions, determining what should be 
done to improve the situation.6 These often go together: a judgment that the law 
is faulty often leads up to a recommendation that the law needs to be improved 
to correct that fault, but this combination is not necessary.7 Evaluative questions 
can also stand on their own. In order to answer normative questions, a framework 
is needed that provides a yardstick, a set of standards or values that can serve 
to support a judgment. For instance, in criminal procedure the principles of fair 
trial, and the right to a fair trial as laid down in the European Convention on 
Human Rights, yield standards against which a researcher may assess whether 
access to an attorney in the early stages of an investigation is sufficiently secured.
Unlike theoretical frameworks in social science, which are often a separate topic 
in methods handbooks, normative frameworks in legal research are hardly dis-
cussed. Westerman argues that this is because the legal system is used as the 
implicit theoretical framework (Westerman 2011, p. 90). On her view, doctrinal 
legal research is inherently normative and uses the principles of the legal sys-
tem as standards. This makes the distinction between theoretical and normative 
framework superfluous: the legal system is both at the same time. In his com-
ment on Westerman, Vranken strongly disagrees with the idea of the system as 
theoretical framework (Vranken 2011). He sees the legal system as the subject 
of a range of theoretical perspectives, and the normative principles by which to 
judge that system as varied too. The question of what can serve as a normative 
framework is a crucial one, therefore, because it is an important determinant of 
the plausibility of the answer to a normative question.
4. Internal and External Framing
In order to address the issue of finding and developing a normative framework 
systematically, it is useful to distinguish between internal and external frame-
works (Kestemont 2015, p. 373). ‘Internal’ refers to standards that are part of the 
law, its principles and values, while ‘external’ refers to theories that provide such 
standards. This is not to say that the distinction between internal and external 
is clear-cut – there are many borderline cases – but it is helpful to survey the 
terrain.8
Looking for internal frameworks means tracing the normative basics within pos-
itive law. In most fields of law, certain basic principles and values are stated or 
presupposed. In private law introductions, students are taught that the freedom 
of contract and security of property are basic to the private law system and that 
6 Van der Burg 2017 distinguishes evaluative questions, such as ‘Is the law good?’, from norma-
tive questions, such as ‘How can it be improved?’.
7 Often, recommendations take the form of a suggestion to improve legislation, but they may 
also concern new ways of interpreting statute or developing case law or the need to recognize a 
new principle of law.
8 On internal versus external perspectives in legal scholarship, more generally, see Taekema 
2011.
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there is a test of fairness or equity in solving concrete disputes. Specific areas 
of private law have their own principles, such as the protection of consumers 
or employees or the best interests of the child. What all of these have in com-
mon is that they are basic principles that are either explicitly stated or implicitly 
presupposed in positive law: they are part of the legal system. In public law, the 
principles of rule of law and human rights have a similar basic function, with fun-
damental rights being granted a special status in treaties or constitutional bills of 
rights. These are also seen as foundational elements of positive law. This is not to 
claim that these principles and values are completely contained in the sources of 
law: there is controversy in legal theory (between positivism and interpretivism) 
over the extent to which principles and values can be seen as extending beyond 
source-based rules and drawing on moral and political values.9 However, in both 
theories it is possible to find or construct principles of law. These basic princi-
ples and values easily serve as internal normative frameworks, i.e., as those parts 
of positive law that yield standards for evaluation. Sometimes, work needs to be 
done to formulate the implicit principles more clearly in order to apply them, but 
in many cases the basic material is there in positive law or in earlier formulations 
in legal doctrine.10
However, law is not usually studied in splendid isolation. If law is regarded as 
reacting to the social and political environment, other goals and values come 
into play, which are part of external frameworks. Looking at law from a broadly 
moral external perspective, one might say that law itself must always be assessed 
according to justice: to what extent does the legal system reproduce social injus-
tices or redress them? In order to develop such a broad ideal into a normative 
framework, a theory is needed on what principles of equality and freedom sup-
port that ideal. For instance, the liberal political theory of John Rawls provides a 
set of basic principles that can also be used to assess the basic constitutional legal 
structure (Rawls 1971). Critical theory, which sees injustice as the domination 
of powerful groups, can similarly be used to assess legal doctrine (Unger 1986). 
Such external normative frameworks have the advantage that they can serve to 
criticize the basic principles of a legal system itself, transcending the particular 
values of a given legal system. Most of these theories have their basis in social or 
political philosophy.11 Unfortunately, this also makes them rather abstract, often 
showing the need for further refinement if one wants to use them to assess more 
concrete legal developments.
A more concrete way to discover an external framework is to look for policy aims. 
Often, political policies are the point of departure for legal reform. For instance, 
the threat of terrorism has yielded the political aim of enhancing security ser-
9 The classic debate between Hart (1994) and Dworkin (1978) is relevant here, as well as later 
discussions on inclusive positivism (Waluchow 1994).
10 By legal doctrine I mean the scholarly work done by lawyers to clarify and systematize positive 
law. 
11 Although these theories need not be philosophical, other normative theories, for instance 
normative economics, may also yield external criteria, such as efficiency (compare Kestemont 
2015, p. 374).
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vices, for which new legal powers are created to acquire and retain large amounts 
of data. One way to evaluate the new law that results from this policy is by going 
back to the policy aims that generated the law and assessing whether the new law 
actually realizes these aims. Sometimes, there is a coherent policy theory behind 
a new law, and often there is not – many legal reforms are the result of less struc-
tured bargaining between different interest groups, in which case it may be diffi-
cult to reconstruct the political aims behind the law in a coherent manner. There 
are, however, usually at least some identifiable purposes that a law is meant to 
serve, and these can be used as standards in a normative framework. When it 
comes to policy aims or purposes, the distinction between external and internal 
frameworks may not always be clear-cut: sometimes, the policy aims are inte-
grated in the legal text (for instance, in the preamble of a treaty) or become part 
of the standard interpretation in case law. A plausible argument can then be made 
that what were once external goals have become internalized and included in the 
set of internal standards of the legal system. This may depend on the stage of legal 
reform: if a reform is planned or has just been implemented, the need to refer to 
external policy goals is greater. In the context of the discussion here, it is primar-
ily important to stress that external policy aims may be useful building blocks 
for a normative framework and that it is not necessary to limit the resources for a 
normative framework to internal legal purposes.12
Comparing these different external normative frameworks, a distinction can be 
made between the more critical philosophical theories, which are based on the-
oretical arguments for basic values, and the more conventional policy theories, 
which elaborate on the chosen policy aims at a given time and place. The more 
critical perspective can, of course, also be applied to the conventional policy goals 
rather than only to the law that is used to implement these goals. To return to 
the security example, a political theory of individual freedom can use values of 
privacy and individual autonomy to criticize extension of the powers of security 
services. This is not just a criticism of the law itself, but also of the policy goals 
behind it.
Finally, there is the possibility of combining internal and external normative 
standards. Ideally, any law is good in terms of both legal values and of social and 
political values. Thus, it makes sense to combine assessment of a law on the basis 
of constitutional rights with assessment on the basis of principles of social jus-
tice. However, it is usually not feasible to perform such a broad evaluation in one 
research project (Van der Burg 2017). As long as it is made clear which set of stand-
ards is used for the assessment, a more limited evaluation is perfectly acceptable.
12 Again, the question can be raised regarding the sense in which legal purposes are really internal 
to law (see footnote 8).
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5. Implicit Standards: Uncovering Normativity in Legal Research
The consideration of frameworks for legal research offered so far, which were pre-
dominantly meant to serve as support for practical research aims, can be contex-
tualized by linking to the scholarly debate on the nature of legal research itself. 
It is worthwhile to do so in order to make clear how the normativity of practical 
reason, which underlies the need for normative framing, may be accounted for 
in legal scholarship. Thus, in this second part, the emphasis shifts from a discus-
sion of the nature and function of theoretical and normative frameworks to the 
broader question of how to understand the nature of legal scholarship: how may 
we best understand the connection between descriptive and normative scholar-
ship? As a preliminary step, this section is about the character of legal scholarship 
as both descriptive and normative.
Legal scholarship has a special position as an academic discipline, because the 
subject matter to which it applies, law, is predominantly concerned with norms. 
The practice of law lives and breathes normativity: interpreting norms, mak-
ing normative judgments, arguing about norms, creating norms, implementing 
norms, sanctioning norm transgressions – the variety of activities concerning 
normativity is endless. Although there are a few other academic disciplines that 
also have this focus on normativity, most notably ethics, with which law shares 
its orientation on practical reason, legal scholarship is characterized by a dual 
attitude to law’s normativity: it regards it as a matter of social fact, and it regards 
it as a normative enterprise. By social fact I do not mean that it subscribes to 
the theory of legal positivism, seeing legal sources as social facts, but rather that 
the norms of law can be described as part of the social and institutional prac-
tice of law. By normative enterprise I mean that legal scholars can also engage in 
the exchange of normative arguments in law, taking part in the debate about the 
right normative judgments within legal practice, taking on the role of an adviser 
to practice.13
The dual character of legal scholarship is an important part of the problem of 
legal methodology: the study of law as an existing practice reveals that it shares 
the descriptive and explanatory focus of social science; its tendency to make 
interpretive normative arguments reveals it as a normative humanities discipline 
such as ethics.14 One might say that legal scholars face an identity problem: are 
they social scientists, normative humanities scholars, or a unique species that 
blends the two?15 I would argue that there is a particular blend of social science 
and humanities aspects and that legal scholarship does not fully belong to either 
group (Taekema 2011). It is not fully social scientific, because it does not usually 
13 Elsewhere, I have argued that this means that most legal scholarship, doctrinal legal scholar-
ship in particular, takes a moderately internal perspective to law: it takes insights from other 
disciplines on board, but it remains committed to normative arguments that are addressed to 
legal practice (Taekema 2011, p. 50).
14 This dual character was argued for by Franken 2004 in the Dutch debate on the nature of legal 
scholarship.
15 For my own argument on how to combine these, see Sections 6 and 7.
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aim at empirical data collection or at answering explanatory questions. In its own 
way, it does gather facts, but then one needs to understand fact-gathering more 
broadly than as empirical data collection. It is not fully part of normative human-
ities, because its arguments need to be based on descriptions of positive law. It 
does make its own normative arguments (as discussed earlier, usually based on 
legal values and principles). I would also claim that most doctrinal legal scholars 
do not want to choose but are also rather vague about how they see the blend 
between the two. This shows most clearly in the research aims pursued in legal 
doctrinal work. Most dissertations, for instance, devote the bulk of their pages 
to describing the intricate workings of a particular area of law, which, especially 
in these times of transnational developments, involves a complicated exercise in 
relating supranational to national law and comparing various national legal sys-
tems. However, they also aim to provide recommendations on how the law in this 
area should be developed, without necessarily making clear how to get from the 
comparative description to the normative judgment (Siems 2014, pp. 22-23). For 
instance, knowing what the differences are between German and Dutch imple-
mentation of EU consumer law does not automatically provide the basis for rec-
ommending that the Dutch use the German implementation as a model.
An important step to take, but one that legal scholars are not really trained in, is to 
uncover the implicit ‘ought’ in their research project. To stay with the (fictitious) 
example, one of the unstated premises of this research on implementation of EU 
consumer law may be that maximizing consumer protection is best, so that the 
conclusion of the comparative research that the German system is more advan-
tageous for the consumer would lead to the judgment that the German system is 
better than the Dutch and should therefore be copied. It is, however, quite crucial 
to explicate this normative premise: one could also argue that maximal consumer 
protection is undesirable, for instance because it hampers efficient transactions. 
Once the unstated premise is made explicit, the question can be asked whether 
there is a sufficient normative basis, a normative framework, for that premise, or 
whether an alternative normative framework is preferable.
There is an important caveat, however: the normative aspect of the research 
needs to remain grounded in the descriptive part. This means that, although it 
is important to include standards from a normative framework to support the 
normative judgment, the researcher needs to relate that normative framework 
to the descriptive results. Again, this is best illustrated by returning to the exam-
ple. Let us imagine that the comparative research shows that Dutch courts have 
developed a particular interpretation of EU consumer law that aims for an even 
balance between consumer interests and the interest of easy business transac-
tions, while the German courts let the consumer interest prevail over the transac-
tion efficiency. Even if the normative framework justifies the German approach, 
the judgment that this should be introduced in the Netherlands is plausible only 
if the context of Dutch legal practice is included in the argument. This means 
that the details of the comparative descriptive work are also highly important to 
contextualize the normative judgment (compare Siems 2014, p. 221). Of course, 
one could argue that the normative judgment can stand on its own and that it 
is enough to say that the Dutch situation must change. However, the practical 
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orientation of legal scholarship makes feasibility an important issue. If one wants 
to advocate change, the chance of success ought to be included; otherwise, the 
relevance to legal practice will be severely limited.
6. Reconnecting ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’: A Pragmatist Framework
Having argued that the descriptive and normative components of legal scholar-
ship need to be distinguished yet connected, I now want to broaden the discus-
sion. What kind of theory of the relationship between facts and normativity can 
back up this characterization of legal research? If social fact and legal norm are 
seen as belonging to two different perspectives, as has been argued, for instance, 
by Kelsen,16 judgments of facts and judgments of norms cannot be combined, 
because the logic of the two perspectives is radically different. Theories that 
relate fact and norm as part of the same scientific enterprise are therefore a more 
promising route. There are different ways of doing so,17 but here I will explore just 
one possibility, taking pragmatist naturalism as a basis for connecting facts to 
normativity. Naturalism is an interesting option because it aims to unify investi-
gation of facts and norms and values by linking them to knowledge about the nat-
ural world (Papineau 2015). Moreover, naturalist theories propose a joint method 
of inquiry for factual and normative questions. With the argument in mind that 
descriptive and normative components of legal scholarship are connected, it 
seems that naturalism offers a possible way of grounding that connection in a 
broader theory.
Naturalism can refer to different theories. Although the common core of nat-
uralism is that research needs to be based on an empirical assessment of facts 
about the world, there are very different ways in which that core can be devel-
oped. On the one hand, one can be skeptical about the worth of normative legal 
research altogether (Holtermann & Madsen 2016); on the other hand, one can 
argue that judgments of fact are interrelated with normative judgments (Del 
Mar 2016). Given the character of legal scholarship as oriented toward practice, 
it seems important to leave space for law’s internal point of view and a role for 
legal scholarship in debate with practitioners. To achieve this, the ability to take 
a normative position as a legal scholar is important. Within naturalism, I will 
therefore explore the pragmatist position that argues that facts and norms are 
interrelated.18
16 For a discussion of this aspect of Kelsen’s theory, see Van Klink and Lembcke 2016, pp. 212-214.
17 Important traditions linking facts and norms in law are hermeneutics (Smith 2011) and inter-
pretivism (Dworkin 1986). 
18 Within the pragmatist literature, the dualism denied is actually that of fact and value (Putnam 
2002). However, I would argue that norms and values are part of the same domain in the con-
text of scholarship and that ontologically, norms are a deontological expression of values (i.e., 
giving standards of conduct needed to realize values). In the context of this article, I will use 
facts and norms or normativity as the main distinction, including values where necessary.
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In a pragmatist perspective, an important starting point to derive from natural-
ism is the basic insight that human beings inevitably engage in social practices, 
which are normative. More particularly, the purposive action of human beings 
generates practices with a point, i.e. an ideal or value toward which the practice is 
oriented (Selznick 2008, pp. 55-56). One way to characterize such naturalism is 
as the claim that the social and purposive nature of humans makes ideal-oriented 
social practices a naturally arising part of human life (Selznick 2008, p. 41).19 Law 
is one of these ideal-oriented social practices and is hard to understand without 
its value-orientation. Therefore, one way in which facts and values (as a form 
of normativity) are related in law is through its character as a naturally arising 
practice through which people try to realize values. In addition to the natural 
base of normativity, the relation also goes the other way: a normative focus also 
influences how one regards facts. This is not to say that all factual judgments are 
biased, but from a pragmatist point of view, there is an inevitable selectivity and 
purposiveness to an inquiry into facts. This is because all inquiry, practical or 
scientific, is driven by a problem-solving orientation. Because of this shared ori-
entation and method, inquiry in practice and in scholarship are only gradually 
different; they are not completely separate enterprises (Dewey 1988, p. 174). It 
is because we regard a situation or idea as problematic that we search for facts 
that help to reconstruct the conditions giving rise to the problem and the conse-
quences that arise from it. Like a theoretical framework, the values attached to a 
problem give context to an empirical inquiry.
Thus, a crucial connection made between factual and normative aspects of schol-
arship is the need for context (Del Mar 2016, p. 235): we cannot understand val-
ues without investigating the concrete pursuit of those values in practice, i.e., 
without an understanding of the factual contexts in which values operate.
7. Humanist Science: Daring to Be Normative
For most social scientists, normativity is a problematic part of scholarship. Most 
scholars see norms and values in either of two ways: as something present in the 
social world that can be studied from an external perspective or as a personal 
attribute of the scholar him- or herself that gives research a moral flavor. Depend-
ing on the importance attached to neutrality as an attribute of good research, 
researchers may try to retain their external and objective position – a neutral 
stance – or they may embrace the influence of their own values on their research 
goals and results – a moral stance. In the context of legal research, the neutral 
stance leads to a purely descriptive research goal or to a careful hypothetical 
argument concerning normative questions. By the latter I mean that researchers 
may argue, for instance, as follows. Supposing that a basic principle of a given 
legal system is non-discrimination – a supposition buttressed by the fact that it 
19 This form of pragmatism has a close affinity to evolutionary thinking. Compare De Been 2008, 
p. 14.
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is in the constitution or a human rights treaty – the principle may be used as a 
major premise in an argument that racial profiling by the police is legally wrong. 
Neutrality is then preserved by using positive law as the basis for the normative 
argument. The moral stance within law means identifying with the basic values of 
the legal order and making them your own. In this case, non-discrimination is not 
just supposed to be part of the particular legal order, it is seen as an integral part 
of the values a researcher personally affirms. Racial profiling is discriminatory 
and legally wrong because it violates the morally right principle of non-discrim-
ination, which is fortunately also part of the legal order the researcher works in.
I think it is unfortunate that we tend to think about the role of normativity in 
such an all-or-nothing fashion. The idea of humanist pragmatism challenges this 
dichotomy and draws attention to the space in between. The most important place 
for normativity and value judgments in scholarship is in what Martin Krygier 
termed ‘clinical assessment’ of a value-laden practice (Krygier 2012, pp. 202-204). 
Krygier points out that in the work of Philip Selznick the diagnosis of the reali-
zation of certain values within society is not strictly neutral: using a normative 
theory, Selznick assesses the strength of value realization within a certain prac-
tice. It is not neutral because the normative theory used is not merely posited but 
constructed on the basis of theoretical argument, and therefore in part depends 
on how convincing it is to the scholar himself. The research is, however, closely 
observant of the factual social situation: only by carefully studying the facts of 
the social context can one make a good assessment. It is therefore not a personal 
moral stance that drives the research: it is a scholarly judgment on the way values 
play out in social practice.
The idea of the clinical assessment of value realization in law can be illustrated by 
using Selznick’s favorite value: the rule of law or legality. Based on a normative 
theory of the point of the practice of law, Selznick argues that we should under-
stand the rule of law as the commitment to “progressively reduce the degree of 
arbitrariness in positive law and its administration” (Selznick 1969, p. 18). Using 
such a notion of the rule of law, it is possible to criticize legal systems for falling 
short in the realization of that ideal, for instance, if there is insufficient restraint 
of official discretion in a certain area of law. It may also be used to criticize a legal 
order more fundamentally, for instance, if a parliament refuses to respect the 
judgments of a constitutional court on the unconstitutionality of a statute, or 
changes the constitution to limit the independence of the judiciary. The benefit 
of such assessments is that they are not limited by the posited values and princi-
ples in basic legal documents but can criticize beyond that positive content, using 
aspects of the normative theory that are tied to the values as formulated within 
positive law but which reach beyond that.
Some may be skeptical about the possibility to do such normative scholarship 
without having a personal stake in the norms and values that are used in the 
assessment. I would argue, however, that there is a subtle difference between per-
sonal conviction and the scholarly judgment that a certain normative theory is 
the most convincing one. The scholarly conviction can be backed by argument 
and put to the test of scholarly debate; moreover, it is tested in its usefulness 
to understand and assess particular situations in which norms and values are at 
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work. Although an element of personal conviction is part of scholarly judgment 
– you need to be convinced of a certain theory or belief to hold and defend it – 
scholarly judgment is open to revision on the basis of argument. These arguments 
may range from the coherence of the normative theory itself to the alignment 
with explanatory theories of human behavior and society to the concrete applica-
tions of the theory in practice.20 The philosophical normative theories discussed 
in section 4 may be used to provide the broader argument for these convictions, 
but these may be made into the subject of debate themselves: the provisionality of 
scholarly normative judgment means that one needs to be open to the argument 
that a theory is untenable for some reason.
8. Concluding Remarks
If I connect the discussion of the interplay between empirical and normative 
aspects of law to the earlier exposition on theoretical and normative frameworks, 
I would argue that the distinction between theoretical and normative frameworks 
is not always so clear-cut. Of course, there is a significant difference between a 
framework supporting questions of explanation and causality and a framework 
supporting questions of evaluation and normative recommendation. However, 
researchers who try to do justice to descriptive accuracy as well as normative 
depth need to connect the two types of framework. A normative framework itself 
may need to be justified, and such justification will in part depend on explanatory 
theories of the nature of human beings and societies. Moreover, as argued in sec-
tion 6, a good understanding of the values at work in law needs to be grounded in 
the understanding of the factual and institutional contexts of law.
Making normative standards explicit and paying closer attention to the argu-
ments supporting normative judgments about law is important for the quality 
of legal research. However, it should not cause legal scholars to forget the close 
connection between their descriptive work on law and the evaluations they give.
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